Hastings Law Journal
Volume 69 | Issue 1

Article 8

12-2017

The Devil in the Details: How the Complexity,
Costs, and Uncertainty of Treasury Regulations
Encourage Corporate Inversion
Jessica Wilson

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jessica Wilson, The Devil in the Details: How the Complexity, Costs, and Uncertainty of Treasury Regulations Encourage Corporate Inversion,
69 Hastings L.J. 387 (2017).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol69/iss1/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

WILSON-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

12/22/17 12:50 AM

The Devil in the Details: How the Complexity,
Costs, and Uncertainty of Treasury Regulations
Encourage Corporate Inversion
JESSICA WILSON*
Politicians and scholars have discussed reforming the corporate tax system for many
years, especially with the emergence of certain tax avoidance practices like inversion
and earnings stripping. While debate in this area has focused primarily on making
changes to the high corporate tax rate and the taxation of worldwide income in the
United States as ways to reverse the inversion problem, less discussion has focused on
how the Treasury’s punitive approach via tax regulations can have the effect of
encouraging, rather than discouraging, firms to relocate and shift profits overseas.
Even considering the recent developments in international tax law under the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation (“OECD”) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(“BEPS”) project and recent rulings by the European Commission, which focus on
corporate tax avoidance, a corporation can greatly reduce its tax and compliance
burden by relocating to a foreign jurisdiction.
This Note examines the added burden of the U.S. Treasury’s approach to dealing with
corporate inversion, with a detailed discussion of the Treasury’s 2016 anti-inversion
regulations. Furthermore, this Note examines the costs and burdens associated with
remaining a U.S. company for tax purposes, as compared to some of the costs and
benefits associated with inversion. It argues that for many companies, the complexity
and costs under corporate tax regulations in the U.S. provide an incentive for
inversion separate from that of the high corporate tax rate and taxation of worldwide
income.

* J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Many thanks to
Professor Manoj Viswanathan for his guidance and encouragement in writing this Note, and to the editors
of the Hastings Law Journal for their dedication and support.
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“The goal of tax policy is to design a tax system that produces the
desired amount of revenue and balances the minimization of these
costs with other objectives, such as equity, transparency, and
administrability.”1

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, much public attention has been given to the laws
governing the taxation of multinational corporations (“MNCs”). Led by
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”), tax authorities have discussed the inconsistencies of tax rules
where a corporate entity spans multiple jurisdictions.2 For the United
States in particular, the varied tax treatment of MNCs in other
jurisdictions, paired with the United States’ relatively burdensome
corporate tax laws, has resulted in corporations shifting their
headquarters and profits overseas.3 The benefits of escaping from¾and
the burdens of remaining under¾the U.S. tax system have resulted in
more than 50 large U.S. MNCs relocating to other jurisdictions over the
past three decades;4 over $2 trillion of accumulated corporate profits
stashed overseas;5 and an estimated $111 billion loss in tax revenue.6
Rather than addressing the core problems of the tax system that motivate
this movement of income and headquarters overseas, the Treasury has
responded to each series of transactions with regulations that have
dramatically complicated corporate tax laws and added to the heavy
compliance burden for U.S. businesses.7 Notably, the U.S. Department of
Treasury’s (“Treasury”) recent anti-inversion action has increased these
burdens by issuing rules restricting certain routine practices for
businesses, significantly raising the standards and costs of compliance
and disallowing important tax attributes for certain transactions. While
the majority of debate in this area maintains that inversion stems from

1. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-878, TAX POLICY: SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF THE
COSTS OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM (2005).
2. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING (2013).
3. Zachary Mider, Tax Inversion, BLOOMBERG QUICK TAKE (Mar. 2, 2017, 9:35 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/tax-inversion.
4. Id.
5. See Robert W. Wood, Despite FATCA, U.S. Companies Stash $2.1 Trillion Abroad—
Untaxed, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2015, 8:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/03/05/
despite-fatca-u-s-companies-stash-2-1-trillion-abroad-untaxed/#44d4192c100f.
6. Howard Gleckman, How Much Revenue the U.S. Is Losing Through Tax Inversions, and How
Much Worse It May Get, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2016, 12:57 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
beltway/2016/01/26/tyco-tax-inversions-income-shifting-and-lost-revenue/#fc6ba624867a.
7. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 107-125.
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the high corporate tax rate and taxation on worldwide profits, the
regulations governing corporate tax in the United States have become
such an obstacle to corporate goals that the regulatory scheme provides
a strong incentive for inversion all on its own.
With high stakes for both companies and governments, many have
contributed to debate in these areas, with detailed plans and predictions
for what the state of business and international tax will¾or should¾look
like in the upcoming years. However, in November 2016, the United
States saw the election of Donald Trump¾a former reality television star
who has never previously held elected office¾to the Office of the
President. President Trump’s tax plan proposes some drastic alterations
to tax law that may result in significant changes to the trends and
practices of both businesses and governments.
A fundamental obstacle to tax reform, however, is that where a
benefit is given in one area, it must be offset by some other area. This
reality has led to months of debate and multiple amendments to any draft
tax reform in 2017.8 By mid-November 2017, the Republican tax plan
remains uncertain, as there has been a constant tug-of-war between the
proposed tax cuts and the limit on increases to the federal deficit.9 While
changes will very likely come in 2018 and the following years, there are
currently mixed signals as to what the corporate tax arena will look like
under the Trump administration.10 Because any changes resulting from
Trump’s presidency are speculative at the time of writing this Note, this
writing focuses on the state of the U.S. corporate tax system prior to any
changes taking place in 2018.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the issue of
corporate inversion, outlining some of the incentives for corporations to
relocate, the scale of the problem in the United States, and the relevant

8. Jacob Pramuk, House GOP Moving Full Speed to Get Tax Reform Done by Year-End, CNBC
(Nov. 14, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/14/house-will-vote-on-tax-reform-billon-thursday.html.
9. See JIM NUNNS, ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF DONALD TRUMP’S TAX PLAN, TAX POL’Y CTR. 2, 5, 11, 21,
23–24 (2015). Estimates of the cost to lowering the corporate tax rate have predicted that the federal
revenue would suffer by $9.5 trillion in the first ten years. Id. at 1, 6. Other estimates have predicted
between $4.4 trillion and $5.9 trillion in just one year. See ALAN COLE, DETAILS AND ANALYSIS OF THE
DONALD TRUMP TAX REFORM PLAN SEPTEMBER 2016, TAX FOUND. 1 (2016). Tax reform was a hot topic
throughout the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and, following the results, House Republicans have
said that they plan to move forward with a tax overhaul, and that they will “be ready to move this early
in 2017.” Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady at the Wall Street Journal CEO Council
in Washington, quoted in Naomi Jagoda, House Panel Readying Tax Bill for Early Next Year, THE
HILL (Nov. 15, 2016, 1:40 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/306124-house-panel-readying-taxbill-for-early-next-year.
10. See Bob Bryan, Senate Republicans Release Major Changes to Their Tax Plan That Would
Make Your Tax Cut Temporary, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 8:55 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/trump-gop-tax-plan-senate-bill-individual-rate-cut-2017-11.
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developments in international tax law bearing the potential to influence
inversion. Part II examines the approach of the Treasury in addressing
the issue of corporate inversion, highlighting specifically the added costs
associated with anti-inversion regulations issued in 2016. Part III seeks
to illustrate how the Treasury’s approach can have the effect of
encouraging inversion for companies with certain characteristics, and
how this approach is contrary to the Treasury’s goal of keeping
corporations in the United States and collecting revenue.
I. CORPORATE INVERSION
Debate on business tax reform has focused on two fundamental
aspects of corporate and international tax law. First, tax burdens
imposed by an MNC’s home country affect the MNC’s decision of where
to place its headquarters.11 High tax rates and the imposition of taxation
on foreign profits in a company’s home country can result in the company
seeking to relocate.12 Second, having and keeping an MNC within a
jurisdiction brings benefits to that jurisdiction.13
A corporate “inversion,” or “expatriation,” is a transaction in which
a U.S. based MNC restructures so that the U.S. parent is relocated in a
foreign jurisdiction.14 In the past two decades, the share of worldwide
income from U.S. based MNCs that is declared abroad has dramatically
increased.15 This trend of moving corporate funds overseas is known as
“income shifting.”16 One way a company accomplishes this is through
inversion transactions, in which the corporation relocates so that it can
shift its income to a jurisdiction with a lower tax burden.17 These
corporate inversions, which occur through the company’s transfer of
stock or assets to a foreign corporation, have been a popular method of
shifting income and reducing tax liability.18 While corporations all over
the world have used this tactic for many years, there is evidence of

11. Omri Marian, Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2015).
12. Johannes Voget, Relocation of Headquarters and International Taxation, 95 J. PUB. ECON.
1067, 1079 (2010).
13. Kimberly A. Clausing, Should Tax Policy Target Multinational Firm Headquarters?,
63 NAT’L TAX J. 741, 744–45 (2010).
14. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Additional Treasury Actions to Rein in
Corporate
Tax
Inversions
(Nov.
19,
2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/jl0281.aspx.
15. See Wood, supra note 5.
16. Charles W. Christian & Thomas D. Shultz, ROA-Based Estimates of Income Shifting by U.S.
Multinational Corporations, in RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2005 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE, STATISTICS INCOME DIVISION, IRS 57 (2005).
17. See DONALD J. MARPLES & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43568, CORPORATE
EXPATRIATION, INVERSIONS, AND MERGERS: TAX ISSUES (2014).
18. OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 2 (2002).
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income shifting specifically from the United States.19 The increase in
corporations relocating from the United States is partially the result of
other countries adopting less strict corporate tax rules, lowering their
corporate income tax, and operating under a territorial system through
which a corporation’s foreign profits are not subject to tax within the
jurisdiction.20 The United States, on the other hand, has not only held on
to its undesirable tax features, but has continued to add to them. Apart
from the United States having the highest corporate tax rate of all
member countries of the OECD and subjecting U.S. corporations to tax
on worldwide profits, the U.S. Treasury often complicates the tax rules
and adds costs through the promulgation of regulations.21
A. THE SCALE OF THE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
Over the past thirty years, the U.S. has seen many of its corporations
relocate to foreign jurisdictions. In 2000, the United States hosted 179 of
the Fortune Global 500 companies.22 In 2013, that number was reduced
to 132.23 In 2014, that number decreased to 128, with a total loss of 51
companies over 14 years.24 These corporations did not disappear from
the United States by going out of business or merging with each other.
Rather, they engaged in inversion transactions, which allowed them not
to be treated as U.S. corporations for tax purposes. While a primary
objective of inversion is to reduce the tax liability of the corporation,
inversion can also reduce its overall tax burden¾that is, the company
can pay less in tax liability and reduce the costs of compliance and
planning.25 This relocation¾at least on paper¾to a low-tax jurisdiction
allows the inverted corporation to avoid being subject to the burdensome
and complicated corporate tax system in the United States.
B.

THE ALLURE OF INVERSION FOR U.S. MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES

Two major features of the U.S. tax system contributing to the appeal
of inversion are its high corporate tax rate and the “worldwide” corporate

19. Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of Multinational Company Income
Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 247, 247 (2012).
20. See MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 17.
21. “Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate,” Table II.1, Tax Database, Country Representatives
on the OECD Working Party 2: Tax Policy and Tax Statistics of the Comm. on Fiscal Affairs,
http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?DataSEtCode=TABLE_II1 (on file with Author).
22. Bob Carroll et al., The Changing Headquarters Landscape for Fortune Global 500
Companies, 240 DAILY TAX REP. J-1, 1 (Dec. 15, 2014).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Nile Nwogu & Barry Plunkett, Corporate Inversions: A Policy Primer, PENN WHARTON
SCH. BUS. PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 24, 2016), https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/
1492-corporate-inversions-a-policy-primer.
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tax system. Under a worldwide tax system, a domestic corporation is
taxed on profits from all income, whether that income is derived in the
United States or abroad.26 Most other countries operate under a
“territorial” system, taxing only income from within the country.27 In
addition to employing a worldwide system, the United States has a top
corporate income tax rate of thirty-five percent, which is a clear
motivation for inversion when compared to the United Kingdom at
twenty percent, Luxembourg at nineteen percent28, Ireland at 12.5
percent, Canada at fifteen percent29, and the Cayman Islands at zero
percent.30
These unattractive features of the U.S. corporate tax system are
seemingly an easy fix. The United States could, like most other countries,
lower its corporate tax rate and adopt territorial taxation. A possible
reason for the lack of change is the notion that lowering the corporate tax
rate and shifting to a territorial system would be giving in to the needs of
wealthy corporations. Thus, although this solution has been widely
discussed, it has generally been disregarded for political reasons.31
A third feature of the U.S. corporate tax system, which contributes
to the greatest amount of change in the law from year to year, is the
Treasury’s authority to interpret the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) and
issue regulations thereunder.32 The Treasury’s approach after each wave
of inversions has been to issue regulations addressing the specific
features of the transaction.33 These regulations typically examine what
methods were used in the most recent inversions and then create a new

26. See Thorton Matheson et al., Territorial vs. Worldwide Corporate Taxation: Implications
for Developing Countries 3–4 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper, Paper No. WP/13/205, 2013)
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13205.pdf.
27. Id.
28. 2017 Luxembourg Tax Reform Voted by the Luxembourg Parliament, BAKER MCKENZIE (Dec.
16, 2016), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2016/12/2017-luxembourg-taxreform-voted/.
29. Canada provides a basic rate of tax at thirty-eight percent of taxable income, which is then
reduced to twenty-eight percent after federal tax abatement. Corporation Tax Rates, Government of
Candada, https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/tax/businesses/topics/corporations/
corporation-tax-rates.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). After a general tax reduction, the federal
corporate tax rate is fifteen percent, not including the varying provincial or territorial rates. Id.
30. KPMG, Corporate Tax Rates Table, KPMG INT’L COOPERATIVE, https://home.kpmg.
com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.
html (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
31. See DELOITTE, THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM IN THE 114TH CONGRESS 3–9 (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/Tax/us-tax-the-politics-of-taxreform-in-the-114th-congress-041415.pdf; see also John W. Diamond et al., The Dynamic Economic
Effects of a U.S. Corporate Income Tax Rate Reduction (Oxford U. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working
Paper No. 14/05, 2014).
32. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2016).
33. See MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 17, at 9.
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rule with higher standards and higher costs for being treated as a
non-U.S. corporation. As a result, any corporation undertaking the same
type of transaction will be treated as a U.S. corporation for tax purposes
and still be subject to U.S. tax; thus limiting or eliminating the benefits
of these transactions.34
1. Factors Impacting Location Decisions for Multinational
Entities
Deeply rooted in the U.S. legal system is the notion that corporations
are “organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.”35 Thus, when a corporation is placed under certain
pressures that inhibit the ability of the firm to maximize shareholder
value, it has a duty to examine the obstacles faced and pursue strategies
that better accommodate reaching this goal. For example, in 2013, a
global survey that interviewed a sample of the world’s largest
multinational research and development investors found that three
factors primarily affect a firm’s decision on where to invest, two of which
were tax “planning certainty and simplicity” in the tax law.36 In 2016, a
survey examining the concerns of corporate officers found that
over-regulation continued to be a primary interest.37 Nearly half of the
executives surveyed cited compliance with unclear regulations as adding
to the cost of doing business, which is then often passed on to consumers
through price increases.38 When conducting business under unclear and
inconsistent standards, companies face the issue of trying to balance
shareholder expectations of growth and profitability with staying outside
the reach of the often harsh consequences of the tax rules.39
When excessive time and money are required for compliance with
the tax code and regulations thereunder, businesses consume resources
that could otherwise be used for investment purposes and business
operations, which contribute to the growth and value of the firm. Because
the management of an MNC seeks to structure investment and financing

34. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Treasury’s Final Earnings Stripping
Regulations to Narrowly Target Corporate Transactions That Erode U.S. Tax Base (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0580.aspx.
35. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
36. JOST H. HECKEMEYER ET AL., A SURVEY OF TAXATION & CORPORATE INNOVATION,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 13 (Aug. 2015), https://www.pwc.de/de/steuerberatung/assets/
pwc-a-survey-of-taxation-and-corporate-innovation-2015.pdf. The third factor identified as affecting
location decisions for investment in this survey is the “immediate impact on liquidity.” Id.
37. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 19TH ANNUAL GLOBAL CEO SURVEY: REDEFINING BUSINESS
SUCCESS IN A CHANGING WORLD 2 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2016/
landing-page/pwc-19th-annual-global-ceo-survey.pdf.
38. Id. at 18.
39. Id. at 19.
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decisions that maximize the firm’s value, it is essential that management
prioritize the most efficient use of the company’s capital.40 While there
are certainly other factors to be weighed, the way MNCs are taxed
“importantly affects their investment decisions, their location decisions,
and how they finance themselves.”41
a.

Stability in Legal Regime

Theory on MNCs suggests that the choices it makes regarding
location are a function of the need to reach corporate goals and create
advantages for the firm.42 Furthermore, investors and shareholders
typically have a strong understanding of the relationship between
companies and the regulatory systems in which they operate.43 By
relocating headquarters overseas, the MNC commits to laws and
regulations of the new host country and potentially benefits from host
country’s improved legal and regulatory regime, thereby sending signals
to investors that it is operating under certain standards of governance.44
The signal sent to investors when a firm establishes headquarters or
remains established in the United States is that the firm is operating
under increasingly heavy regulatory burdens and costs that restrict
flexibility, consume valuable time and resources, and reduce potential
return.
b.

Simplicity and Certainty in the Tax Law

Where a tax system lacks simplicity, is ambiguous, or is inconsistent,
neither the government nor its taxpayers can effectively plan and budget
in accordance with their goals. Certainty in the law, or lack thereof, can
significantly affect a taxpayer’s decision-making in several ways.45 The
ability to predict, or at least roughly estimate, tax liability can contribute
to more rational choices in transactions, whereas uncertainty can

40. A.M. Goyal, Impact of Capital Structure on Performance of Listed Public Sector Banks in
India, 2 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. INVENTION 35, 35 (2013).
41. The Impact of International Tax Reform on U.S. Competitiveness: Hearing on H.R. 25, S,
1050, and H.R. 2060 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. On Ways
and Means, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Glenn Hubbard, Dean of Columbia Bus. Sch. and
former Chair of the President’s Council of Econ. Advisers).
42. See Julian Birkinshaw et al., Why Do Some Multinational Corporations Relocate Their
Headquarters Overseas?, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 681, 684 (2006) (discussing MNC locational choices
as a function of “firm-specific advantages” and “country-specific advantages”).
43. Gregory Day, Irrational Investors and the Corporate Inversion Puzzle, 69 SMU L. REV. 453,
487 (2016).
44. MIKE W. PENG, GLOBAL STRATEGY 315 (2d ed. 2009).
45. JASON PIPER, ASS’N CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCOUNTANTS, CERTAINTY IN TAX 3 (2014),
http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/tax-publications/tech-tp-cit.pdf.
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influence decisions on whether to pursue or continue a business or
activity, based solely on the fear of harsh tax consequences.46
A firm’s decision of whether and where to invest is complex, and will
vary based on the specific goals and needs of the firm. The tax cost of
being a U.S. company is undoubtedly high, but it is not the only factor
taken into consideration when determining corporate location. While tax
incentives influence decisions on corporate location, “[t]ransparency,
simplicity, stability and certainty in the application of the tax law and [in]
tax administration” generally bear greater weight than tax incentives.47
Surveys examining firm decision making with respect to tax jurisdiction
have found that tax incentives can actually be a discouraging feature of
a jurisdiction where the rules are difficult to track, understand or comply
with, because such complexity tends to increase costs to firm activity and
limit growth.48 Because instability and unpredictability in a tax system
add risk and create excessive burden that consumes firm resources, these
factors are considered key in a firm’s decision on where to locate its
headquarters and invest.49 Thus, while the higher total tax liability a
company faces under the U.S. tax system certainly factors into the
decision to relocate, the unpredictability and complexity of the tax
administration in the United States has an important influence on a
firm’s decision to relocate as well.
2. The Volume and Complexity of the U.S. Tax Code and
Regulations
Most people get the short version of U.S. corporate tax law: a thirty
-five percent corporate tax on worldwide profits. But the law that gives
us that information is notorious for its length and complexity. By the end
of 2015, the U.S. Tax Code contained just under 2.5 million words, while
federal tax regulations contained over 7.6 million words.50 This figure
excludes the large body of case law to which taxpayers must also
comply.51 The October 2016 preamble and regulations to Section 385 of

46. Id.
47. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., Tax Incentives for Investment: A Global Perspective
Experiences in MENA and Non-MENA Countries, in MAKING REFORMS SUCCEED: MOVING FORWARD
WITH THE MENA INVESTMENT POLICY AGENDA 225, 229 (2008).
48. Id. at 228–29.
49. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. ET AL., SOUTH EAST EUROPE REGION:
ENTERPRISE POLICY PERFORMANCE A REGIONAL ASSESSMENT, OECD AND EUR. BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV. 34–35 (2003) (analyzing key factors prompting firms’ location decisions
in the context of South East Europe).
50. Scott Greenberg, Federal Tax Laws and Regulations Are Now Over 10 Million Words Long,
TAX FOUND. (Oct. 8, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/federal-tax-laws-and-regulations-are-nowover-10-million-words-long.
51. Id.
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the Code span over 500 pages long.52 For large MNCs, the complexity of
the U.S. tax rules requires a great amount of resources just for
compliance. For example, Mobil Corporation once brought its federal tax
documents to a congressional hearing to demonstrate the extent of its
compliance burden.53 The documents totaled 6300 pages and weighed
seventy-six pounds.54 And, in multiple years, Citigroup’s tax returns have
exceeded 30,000 pages.55
To complicate things further, each year there are changes or
additions, requiring corporate taxpayers to track the changes and adapt
with each new layer of rules. The rules become increasingly complex for
firms with operations in more than one jurisdiction.
Businesses hire accountants, lawyers and tax professionals to help
them navigate the Code and to prepare, file, and pay their taxes. When it
comes to MNCs, more advanced legal and accounting services are
typically required, including tax legal counsel; tax accounting counsel;
transfer pricing consulting; certain technology systems to maintain a
broader range of detailed records; corporate planning, financial planning
and forecasting professionals; and other miscellaneous costs.56
3. The Burdens Associated With Doing Business Under U.S. Tax
Law
The cost of compliance usually refers to all tax-related costs other
than the actual taxes paid.57 The core legal costs include time costs, such
as the time spent maintaining books and receipts; cash outlays related to
tax obligations; purchases of tax-related software or publications; and
payments to others, such as tax lawyers and accountants.58 The major
activities involved in tax compliance can include maintaining accounting
data; filing returns; planning and strategy to reduce liability; audits,
appeals and dispute proceedings; and, possibly, tax penalties and
prosecution proceedings, to name a few.59 Aside from these direct costs,
businesses may incur indirect costs, such as delayed tax refunds that

52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385 (2016).
53. Chris Edwards, Simplifying Federal Taxes: The Advantages of Consumption-Based
Taxation, 416 POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 5 (2001).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HOW THE PROPOSED SECTION 385 REGULATIONS COULD IMPACT
CORPORATE
TREASURY
17
(2016),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/risk-management/assets/
how-the-proposed-section-385-regulations-could-impact-corporate-treasury.pdf.
57. INV. CLIMATE ADVISORY SERVS. OF THE WORLD BANK GRP., A HANDBOOK FOR TAX SIMPLIFICATION
34 (2009).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 36.
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reduce the present value of the net cash flow of the business.60 Certain
indirect costs are less quantifiable, such as the costs of ambiguous
guidelines or rates, which change firm behavior.61
From a leadership perspective, inversion can be attractive as a way
to limit these costs by reducing the corporate management’s duty to
comply with difficult regulations.62 While the corporate tax rate imposes
high cost burdens, the corporate tax regulations in the United States
impose not just financial burdens, but also consume a significant amount
of time and effort. As the complexities within the tax regulations continue
to multiply, the costs of doing business increase as well. The ongoing
compliance requirements and uncertainties arising from the changing
regulatory scheme result in the need to keep a number of highly qualified
tax professionals employed so that a firm can adapt to unexpected
changes. For example, Citigroup, a Delaware corporation, employed
approximately 30,000 regulatory and tax compliance staff in 2015, as
compared to approximately 14,000 in 2008, with compliance costs as
high as $4.4 billion in a given year.63
In a 2013 case study using data compiled by the World Bank,
analysts considered 166 different economies using three indicators to
measure a tax system’s administrative burden on businesses.64 In 2013,
the United States averaged approximately 175 hours to comply with
federal taxes per entity.65 Compare this figure to the averages of 59 hours
in Luxembourg, 63 hours in Switzerland, and 80 hours in Ireland for the
same year.66 Most countries saw a decline in the number of hours needed
to comply in the years following 2013.67 However, the U.S. remained at
175 hours through 2015, which is only slightly lower than the 187-hour
average in the four years prior to 2013.68
It also costs American companies significantly more to compute
their U.S. tax on foreign income than to compute their U.S. tax on
domestic income.69 For U.S. MNCs, foreign activities have accounted for

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Day, supra note 43, at 457.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K CITIGROUP INC. ANNUAL REPORT 62 (Jan. 15, 2016).
Andrew Sentance, An Economic Analysis: Taxation, Economic Growth and Investment, in
PAYING TAXES 2013: THE GLOBAL PICTURE 23, 25 (2013), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/
paying-taxes/assets/pwc-paying-taxes-2013-full-report.pdf (comparing the total tax rate as a
percentage of profits; the number of different payments which businesses are required to deal with;
and the time spent by businesses in complying with the tax laws).
65. Id. at 118 Fig.2.48.
66. Id. at 16 Fig. 1.3, 98 Fig. 2.38.
67. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & WORLD BANK GRP., PAYING TAXES 2015: THE GLOBAL PICTURE 116
(2015), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes/pdf/pwc-paying-taxes-2015-high-resolution.pdf.
68. Id.
69. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, TAXATION OF AMERICAN COMPANIES IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: A PRIMER
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39 percent of costs incurred to comply with U.S. tax rules, even though
the percentage of assets and employment located abroad was less than
half of that.70 While some industries encounter greater compliance costs
than others, the general finding in this area has been that part of a U.S.
company’s disadvantaged status compared to foreign competitors is the
costs of complying with the U.S. tax rules.71
As the Treasury continues to impose even more costs to an even
broader range of businesses in the U.S., relocating headquarters may
begin to seem like the only way to remain profitable for firms with certain
features. Having a multinational group owned beneath a U.S.
corporation has become not only unappealing, but practically bad
business if the goal of the corporation is to maximize value and operate
in the best interests of its shareholders.
4. Post-Inversion Advantages to a Corporation
The following examples illustrate how inversion can allow a
company to substantially reduce its effective tax rate, increase its
attractiveness for investment, and operate with the flexibility to improve
and expand the business.
a.

Lower Effective Tax Rate

As a very basic example of the potential for tax savings through
inversion, imagine that U.S. Corporation, taxed at a thirty-five percent
rate, has $90,000 income generated in the United States and $10,000
from the Irish territory. Similarly, Irish Corporation, taxed at 12.5
percent in Ireland, has $10,000 income from the U.S. and $90,000 from
Ireland.72
If there is no inversion, U.S. Corporation is taxed at thirty-five
percent on both United States and Irish-source income. U.S. Corporation
will have a tax liability of $35,000¾thirty-five percent multiplied by its
income from both territories. Irish Corporation, however, will have a tax
liability of $14,750¾thirty-five percent multiplied by the U.S. income of

24 (2011).
70. Id.
71. Joel Slemrod, The (Compliance) Cost of Taxing Business 7–10 (Apr. 25, 2006) (unpublished
research
paper)
(on
file
with
Mimeo
Uni.
of
Mich.),
http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/jslemrod/pdf/cost_of_taxing_business.pdf;
see
also
Martha
Blumenthal & Joel B. Slemrod, The Compliance Cost of Taxing Foreign-Source Income: Its
Magnitude, Determinants, and Policy Implications, 2 INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 37 (1995) (finding that the
compliance cost of taxing foreign-source income is about forty percent of total tax compliance costs to
large U.S. corporations).
72. The structure of this example was adapted from James G. S. Yang, Corporate Inversions:
Rules and Strategies, 43 J. CORP. TAX’N 3, 8 (May/June 2016).
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$10,000, plus 12.5 percent multiplied by the Irish-source income of
$90,000. The combined tax liability for the two corporations is $49,750.
Alternatively, if inversion occurs and U.S. Corporation merges with
Irish Corporation, then the total U.S. income of $100,000 ($90,000 plus
$10,000) is always taxed at thirty-five percent, leaving a tax liability of
$35,000. On the other hand, the total income from the Irish territory of
$100,000 is always taxed at 12.5 percent, resulting in a tax liability of
$12,500. Thus, the total tax liability on income from both territories after
the inversion is $47,500.
Because the foreign territory income is not subject to the higher U.S.
tax rate, as the example illustrates, part of the tax savings from inversion
comes from the lower tax rate on income from the foreign territory.
Lowering the firm’s tax liability, however, is just one of the ways a firm
can benefit from leaving the United States. Other factors encouraging the
decision include the opportunity for earnings stripping; modest
transactional costs, especially as compared to the costs of remaining in
the United States; continued access to capital markets; market
acceptance and eligibility for government contracts following the
inversion; and the ability to avoid the deficiencies in the U.S. tax laws
governing multinationals.73
b.

Examples of Post-Inversion Tax Savings

A study released in late 2016 examining inverted companies from
1983 to 2014 found that, in the aggregate, firms reduced their corporate
tax liabilities between $16.9 billion and $25.3 billion through inversion.74
This research further found that many shareholders experience a positive
net benefit from inversion.75
For example, Transocean, an oil drilling company, inverted to
Switzerland in 1999 and reduced its tax rate by approximately 50 percent,
saving more than $2 billion in taxes over a ten-year period.76 Similarly,
Caterpillar, Inc., a Delaware construction equipment manufacturer, also
relocated to Switzerland in 1999, saving approximately $2.4 billion in tax
in the twelve years following its inversion.77 Many other inverted

73. John C. Hamlett, The Declining Allure of Being “American” and the Proliferation of
Corporate Tax Inversions: A Critical Analysis of Regulatory Efforts to Curtail the Inversion Trend,
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 767, 775 n.77 (2016).
74. Anton Babkin et al., Are Corporate Inversions Good for Shareholders?, J. FIN. ECON.
26 (2016).
75. Id. at 23.
76. Mitchell Franklin et al., To Invert or Remain a U.S. Multinational: The Consequences Are the
Question, 43 J. CORP. TAXATION 17, 19 (Nov./Dec., 2016).
77. Caterpillar’s Offshore Tax: Strategy: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. On
Investigations Comm. on Homeland Security & Gov’t Affairs, 113th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2014) (statement of
Sen. Levin, Chairman, S. Comm. on Investigations).
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companies have experienced similar tax savings, including Burger King
in 2014, with an estimated tax savings of $275 million in the three years
following its inversion; and Medtronic, in the largest inversion deal so
far, with expected savings large enough that its executives agreed to
trigger the roughly $63 million in capital gains taxes as part of the
transaction.78
C.

CORPORATE INVERSION AND CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW

Recent changes in international tax law are worth noting, as they
affect a firm’s decision on whether or not to relocate.79 With the OECD’s
2013 report on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”), a global action
plan was initiated to address the perceived flaws in international tax law
that have allowed MNCs to shift profits and avoid taxation.80 However,
even taking into consideration the potential for upcoming changes to
foreign countries’ domestic tax laws, which might decrease the appeal of
relocating to a particular jurisdiction, the costs associated with
remaining in the United States continue to outweigh those of relocating.
1. Inversion in the United Kingdom
The previous tax system in the United Kingdom tells a familiar story.
Prior to 2009, the U.K.¾like the U.S. now¾operated under a worldwide
system and had a high corporate tax rate. In the early 1990s, the U.K. had
a corporate tax rate of 33 percent and charged tax on global profits of
U.K.-resident companies.81 In 2006, a decision issued by the European
Court of Justice (“ECJ”) sparked a wave of corporate inversions out of
the U.K.82 The ruling established that the U.K. could not impose its
corporate tax on foreign subsidiaries of U.K. MNCs.83 Following this
ruling, U.K. corporations began moving quickly to Ireland.
After the U.K. saw many of its large corporations fleeing to Ireland,
it reformed its corporate tax system in an attempt to stop the problem of
inversion and become a more attractive jurisdiction for corporations. The

78. Franklin et al., supra note 76, at 20.
79. See supra notes 36-45.
80. See generally About the Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
tax/beps/beps-about.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017).
81. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: UNITED KINGDOM 2007 141
(2007).
82. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 17, at 7.
83. See Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd., et al., v. Commissioners of Inland
Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. I-07995. In Cadbury Schweppes, a corporate group, Cadbury Schweppes
Overseas, had established two subsidiaries in Ireland so that profits related to the internal financing
activities of the Cadbury Schweppes group would benefit from Ireland’s more favorable tax regime.
The case called into question the Freedom of Establishment Clause, which the Court ultimately held
could not be invoked in another European Union member state purely for tax purposes. See id.
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U.K. (1) shifted from taxing worldwide profits to a territorial system,
under which it applied the corporate income tax only to income earned
within its borders; (2) lowered its corporate tax rate to 28 percent in
2010, and then again to 21 percent in 2014; and (3) reformed its rules for
controlled foreign corporations (“CFCs”) to tax overseas profits only
where there was artificial reduction of U.K. tax, rather than taxing all
profits of the CFC.84 Following the changes to the corporate tax system
in the U.K. in 2009, many previously inverted companies returned to the
U.K., and many previously U.S. headquartered companies followed.85
The U.K.’s corporate inversion problem and subsequent tax reform
is often used as a possible example for the United States to follow in
dealing with its own inversion problem. Beyond the example of the U.K.,
the argument has been made multiple times for the United States to
lower its corporate tax rate and switch to a territorial system. However,
the United States has firmly resisted change in these areas, and continues
to address its inversion problem primarily through the regulatory
system.
2. The OECD, BEPS, and the European Commission
One concern surrounding the U.S. corporate tax system and the
inability to reverse the inversion trend is the level of competitiveness the
United States offers its MNCs. Because most other countries offer
considerably lower corporate tax rates, tax only income earned within a
jurisdiction, and provide much simpler rules for businesses to navigate,
there are obvious incentives for a corporation to relocate. But recent
changes in international tax were initiated with the goal of limiting
certain tax-avoidance practices like, for example, corporate inversion.
Since the release of the OECD’s report and BEPS Action Plan, many
of the OECD member countries have taken steps to enact changes to local
tax laws, including new rules regarding CFCs, permanent establishment
status, and transparency¾all which aim to support the OECD’s
guidelines for creating a more clear and functional international tax
landscape.86 These adjustments to the local tax laws of OECD countries
have the potential to make it difficult for corporations to invert and shift
profits overseas. In addition, the European Commission’s
(“Commission”) recent decisions regarding its Member States’ provision

84. William McBride, Tax Reform in the UK Reversed the Tide of Corporate Tax Inversions, TAX
FOUND. 4 (Oct. 2014).
85. See, e.g., Tom Bergin, Britain Becomes Haven for U.S. Companies Keen to Cut Tax Bills,
REUTERS (June 8, 2014, 11:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-usa-tax-insightidUSKBN0EK0BF20140609.
86. See
BNA,
BEPS
Tracker,
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
11,
2016),
http://0-taxandaccounting.bna.com.hopac.uchastings.edu/btac/T17302/beps_aqb.adp.
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of tax benefits to corporations offers another potential hurdle for
companies seeking to invert and receive the same tax “deals” that have
previously been available to other inverted corporations.87
However, these changes are not enough to outweigh the burdens
associated with incorporating or remaining incorporated in the United
States. OECD members have been quick to participate in discussion, but
slow to act. And the United States, on the other hand, is quick to issue
punitive domestic measures that require businesses to change practices
and adapt, without taking the time to reach the root of the inversion
problem. Thus, even with the progress taken toward changing
international tax laws, U.S. corporations continue to have a strong
incentive to invert.
a.

OECD Members and Implementation of BEPS’ Actions

A goal of the OECD in issuing the BEPS Action Plan is to coordinate
domestic tax rules across borders so that international tax standards may
keep pace with the changing global business environment.88 Akin to the
U.S. regulations regarding related-party debt between multinational
groups and location of headquarters is BEPS Action 4. Action 4 seeks to
limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments
by focusing on third party, related party, and intragroup debt.89
Tax rules in a jurisdiction can greatly influence debt transactions
within multinational groups, as groups often use intragroup financing as
a way to claim interest deductions and defer income.90 Additionally, the
definition of a permanent establishment is important in determining
whether a non-resident entity must pay income tax in another country.91
While Actions 4 and 7, as well as other BEPS Actions, seek to address
problems that have the potential to reduce inversion issues for the United
States, the fact that the OECD is a global consortium with no
implementation authority makes the guidelines set forth just that
¾guidelines.92 Passage and enforcement of the Actions proposed by the
87. See Press Release, European Comm’n, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Apple
Worth Up to €13 Billion (Aug. 30, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2923_en.html.
88. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: OECD/G20 BASE EROSION
PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT 5 (2015), www.oecd.org/tax/beps-explanatory-statement-2015.pdf.
89. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., LIMIT BASE EROSION VIA INTEREST DEDUCTIONS AND
OTHER FINANCIAL PAYMENTS, ACTION 4—2015 FINAL REPORT 11 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789262411176-en.
90. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING
PROJECT—2015 FINAL REPORTS, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 10, 13–14 (2015), http://www.oecd.
org/ctp/beps-frequently-asked-questions.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Hamish Boland-Rudder, OECD’s Tax Crackdown Calls for Global Profit Reporting, INT’L
CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.icij.org/blog/2014/
09/oecds-tax-crackdown-calls-global-profit-reporting/.
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OECD are left to individual countries to implement domestically if, and
as they choose.
The primary countries to which U.S. corporations have typically
relocated¾the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, and the U.K.¾have
discussed making changes to their domestic laws regarding Actions 4 and
7.93 As members of the OECD, this discussion is natural. But these
jurisdictions still have a need and desire to attract investment. Because
the BEPS Actions¾described as “best practice” or “common approach”
¾are not minimum standards, it is not likely that there will be change in
many areas, at least in the short term.94 The Irish government, for
example, has expressed that it is completely committed to keeping its
corporate tax rate of 12.5 percent and, while it is open to “playing fair[,]”
it is also “playing to win.” 95 The Dutch government has also recognized
the need to remain attractive to MNCs, stating that its broad
participation exemption, lack of withholding tax on royalties and interest
payments, and other advantages will remain unchanged.96
The OECD, through the BEPS initiative, has provided some useful
guidance and tools for tax authorities to use in addressing base erosion
and profit shifting. But even if countries adopt the guidelines with full
force¾which is highly unlikely and would require the rewriting of
thousands of tax laws¾the U.S. problem of inversion does not pend
solely on whether other countries become less desirable than they are
currently, but rather on whether the United States becomes less costly
and less burdensome to its corporate taxpayers.
b.

The European Commission and State-Aid Rulings

The OECD is not the only force with the potential to spark change in
international corporate tax practices. The Commission recently released
rulings and initiated investigations on EU member states providing
selective state aid to certain companies.97 For example, in July 2016, the
93. See generally DELOITTE, BEPS ACTIONS IMPLEMENTATION BY COUNTRY: LUXEMBOURG (Mar.
2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-beps-actions
-implementation-luxembourg.pdf; DELOITTE, BEPS ACTIONS IMPLEMENTATION BY COUNTRY: IRELAND
(March 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-beps
-actions-implementation-ireland.pdf; DELOITTE, BEPS ACTIONS IMPLEMENTATION BY COUNTRY:
LUXEMBOURG (March 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/
Tax/dttl-tax-beps-actions-implementation-netherlands.pdf.
94. Louise Kelly, Ireland: An Attractive Location in a Post-BEPS World, 27 INT’L TAX REV.
60 (2016).
95. Ireland Tax Alert: BEPS Consultation Process Launched, DELOITTE (May 27, 2014),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-alert-ireland-270514.pdf.
96. Tax Insights: Dutch Government Responds to Final BEPS Reports, PRICEWATERHOUSE
COOPERS (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/tax-services/publications/insights/assets/
pwc-dutch-government-responds-to-final-beps-reports.pdf.
97. See ROBERT B. STACK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY RELEASES WHITE PAPER ON
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Commission issued a decision holding that Spain’s tax treatment of
certain football clubs¾applying a special corporate tax rate¾constituted
unlawful state aid.98 Again, in August 2016, the Commission ruled that
Ireland gave illegal “tax benefits to Apple worth up to €13 billion” (or
$14.5 billion).99 Over the past few years, the Commission has also
initiated investigations into similar generous tax deals offered to MNCs.
Note that deals between Luxembourg and Fiat, and between the
Netherlands and Starbucks, have already been found unlawful.100
However, the winners and losers of the Commission’s rulings are not
exactly clear. While the countries to which the Commission has ordered
companies to pay back taxes will benefit from the income, these
governments want companies like Apple, Fiat, and Starbucks investing
in their jurisdiction and there is concern that too much change will deter
investment.101 As such, the Irish government has announced that it will
seek to appeal the Commission’s Apple ruling, claiming that Ireland
needs to “maintain the jobs [they] have and develop jobs for the
future.”102
The attitude of the Irish government is a perfect indicator that the
domestic tax laws of other countries will not change to the extent needed
to stop corporations from leaving the United States. While part of the
appeal of inversion may be the tax opportunities in other jurisdictions,
the crux of the problem is the inability for U.S. companies to manage the
convoluted U.S. tax system and remain competitive. For instance, Irish
Finance Minister Michael Noonan recently commented that Ireland has
not sought out U.S. businesses, and that the U.S. needs to look to its own
tax system, stating “[w]e don’t invite U.S. companies to come to Ireland
on the basis of inversion and we don’t welcome them when they do, but
under international law we cannot stop them . . . it is a matter for U.S.
authorities to change the law[.]”103

EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECENT STATE AID INVESTIGATIONS INTO TRANSFER PRICING RULINGS 4–5
(Aug. 24, 2016).
98. Press Release, European Comm’n, State Aid: Commission Decides Spanish Professional
Football Clubs Have to Pay Back Incompatible Aid, (July 4, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-16-2401_en.
99. Press Release, supra note 87.
100. Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission Decides Selective Tax Advantages for Fiat in
Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands Are Illegal Under EU State Aid Rules (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5880_en.htm.
101. Id.
102. Paul Hannon, Ireland to Appeal EU’s Apple Tax Ruling, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 2, 2016,
1:58 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/ireland-appeals-eus-apple-tax-ruling-1472820356 (quoting
Paschal Donohoe, Ireland’s Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform).
103. Holly Ellyatt, Here Are the Likely Winners and Losers from the Apple Tax Ruling, CNBC
EUROPE
NEWS
(Aug.
31,
2016,
7:58
AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/31/
heres-the-likely-winners-and-losers-from-the-apple-tax-ruling.html.
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Foreign governments have benefited greatly from the U.S. tax
system driving corporations out, as these firms bring with them jobs and
innovation to their new corporate homes. Even given the potential of the
BEPS Actions and the rulings by the Commission, governments will not
be inclined to make their tax systems as undesirable as the U.S. system,
and the United States would be mistaken to bet the solution to its
inversion problem on the current posture of international tax laws.
II. THE UNITED STATES’ APPROACH: PUNITIVE
ANTI-INVERSION REGULATIONS
The historical approach of the United States in addressing inversion
has resisted making changes to the corporate tax rate or the taxation of
worldwide profits of U.S. MNCs. Rather, the Treasury has adopted a
primarily punitive approach to addressing inversion by adding to the
existing layers of regulations, complicating the day-to-day operations of
businesses, and increasing the costs of remaining in the United States.
This approach, as will later be examined in more detail, is contrary to the
overall goal of the United States in keeping businesses within the
jurisdiction for tax purposes. A potential consequence of the increasing
costs of doing business in the United States is that corporations, which
perhaps have never planned on engaging in inversion, may now consider
doing so as the best option of remaining, or becoming, competitive.
A. THE REGULATORY SYSTEM AND THE TREASURY’S PREVIOUS EFFORTS
TO CURB INVERSION
Inversion is nothing new, and the United States has struggled to find
a balance between keeping and attracting corporations to the United
States, and ensuring that corporations contribute a fair amount to the
U.S. tax base. Previous attempts to stop corporate inversion allowed two
main avenues to remain. First, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
(“Jobs Act”)¾which added Section 7874 to the Code and sought to stop
inversions by denying certain tax benefits¾still allowed for a corporation
to invert if it had substantial business operations in the country where
the firm sought to relocate.104 Second, corporations could invert through
merging with a foreign corporation if the percentage of ownership by the
original U.S. stockholders was less than a certain amount after the
transaction.105 Corporations continued to engage in inversions following
the Jobs Act, and the Treasury responded by issuing multiple rounds of
regulations that altered the ownership threshold, limited the benefits of

104. Jefferson P. VanderWolk, Inversions Under Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code:
Flawed Legislation, Flawed Guidance, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. BUS. 699, 699 (2010).
105. MARPLES & GRAVELLE, supra note 17, at 1, 5.
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inverting, and created harsher penalties for corporations engaging in
these transactions.106
1. A History of Retaliatory Anti-Inversion Regulations
a.

1980s and 1990s

The international relocation of McDermott to Panama in 1983 began
a three-decade long story of U.S. corporate inversions.107 The following
decade saw the highly publicized inversion of Helen of Troy, a cosmetics
company, which relocated to Bermuda in 1993.108 In response to the
Helen of Troy inversion, in 1994 Treasury issued a set of regulations in
which the U.S. target companies’ shareholders would be generally taxed
(despite nonrecognition provisions) if (1) any more than fifty percent of
the new parent company’s stock was received by the U.S. transferors in
the transaction; (2) the foreign acquirer was not engaged in active foreign
business for the prior three years; or if (3) the foreign acquirer was not
worth at least as much as the U.S. target company.109 Following the
regulations, Tyco International inverted in 1997 with a new corporate
home in Bermuda, followed by Transocean inverting in 1999 with a new
home in the Cayman Islands.110
b.

Early 2000s and Beyond

In 2001 and 2002, Cooper Industries, Ingersoll Rand, and Nabor
Industries all left their U.S. home to enjoy a zero percent corporate tax
rate in Bermuda, followed by Noble Drilling in 2002 to the Cayman
Islands.111 To address this growing trend in corporate relocation,
Congress passed the Jobs Act, adding Section 7874 to the Code.112
Although the goal of Section 7874 was to curb inversions, the trend
continued throughout the following decade. From 2005 to 2015, the
following companies engaged in inversions and reincorporation to
low- or no-tax jurisdictions:113
106. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-52, 2014-8, I.R.B 2014-42; I.R.S. Notice 2015-79, 2014-9, I.R.B.
2015-49; see also Press Release, supra note 34.
107. See Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic
Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 315–16 (2004) (attributing McDermott’s relocation as “the first
major restricting to attract significant attention from the IRS.”).
108. Radha Mohan, The Erosion of the States’ Tax Base—A Whopper of a Problem? An
Examination of Possible Solutions to Corporate Inversions, 41 TAX MGMT. WKLY ST. TAX REP. (2014).
109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)–3(c) (1995).
110. See Stuart Webber, Escaping the U.S. Tax System: From Corporate Inversions to
Re-Domiciling, 63 TAX NOTES INT’L 273, 276 (2011).
111. Id.
112. VanderWolk, supra note 104 at 699.
113. The table data was compiled from the following source: Mider, supra note 4; EY, WORLDWIDE
CORPORATE TAX GUIDE (2016).
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2009
2009
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2009
2010
2011
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
2014
2014
2014
2014
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
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U.S. Corporation
Lazard
Argonaut Group
Western Goldfields
Tim Hortons
Ensco
Hungarian Telephone
Altisource Portfolio
Solutions
Valeant
Alkermes
Jazz Pharmaceuticals
Aeon
Rowan
Tronox
DE Master Blenders
1753
Eaton
Stratasys
Tower Group
Liberty Global
Actavis
Perrigo
Endo International
Theravance Biopharma
Horizon Pharma
Burger King
Medtronic
Mylan
Civeo
Wright Medical
LivaNova
Steris

New Country of
Incorporation

409

Bermuda
Bermuda
Canada
Canada
United Kingdom
Denmark
Luxembourg

New
Corporate
Tax Rate
0%
0%
15%
15%
20%
22%
21%

Canada
Ireland
Ireland
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Australia
Netherlands

15%
12.5%
12.5%
20%
20%
30%
25%

Ireland
Israel
Bermuda
United Kingdom
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Cayman Islands
Ireland
Canada
Ireland
Netherlands
Canada
Netherlands
United Kingdom
United Kingdom

12.5%
25%
0%
20%
12.5%
12.5%
12.5%
0%
12.5%
15%
12.5%
25%
15%
25%
20%
20%

In response to this rush of inversions, the Treasury released Notice
2014-52 (“Notice”).114 This Notice addresses certain cross-border
transactions that the IRS identified as facilitating inversions and

114. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces First Steps to Reduce
Benefits of Corporate Inversions: Unfair Practice Erodes the U.S. Tax Base (Sept. 22, 2014),
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2647.aspx.
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avoiding the application of Section 7874.115 The guidance within Notice
2014-52 (1) disregarded certain stock of a foreign acquiring corporation
holding a significant amount of passive assets; (2) disregarded certain
non-ordinary course distributions by the U.S. company; (3) changed the
treatment of certain transfers of stock of the foreign acquiring
corporation; and (4) addressed post-transaction steps that the taxpayer
may take with respect to U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries.116
Again, in November of 2015, the Treasury announced guidance that
made it more difficult to engage in inversion and reduced the benefits of
doing so. Notice 2015–79 expanded on the guidance from Notice
2014-52 by (1) providing a “substantial business activities” test that must
be satisfied if the foreign acquiring corporation is a tax resident in the
foreign jurisdiction; (2) limiting the scope of where the new foreign
parent company may be organized; and (3) clarifying previous
regulations dealing with active business assets involved in the transfer.117
Further, the 2015 Notice announced rules to decrease the tax benefits of
inversion by expanding the scope of inversion gain to include certain
income that cannot be offset by losses, and required that all unrealized
built-in gain in CFC stock be recognized if the transaction terminates the
status of the foreign subsidiary as a CFC.118
c.

2016 Anti-Inversion Regulations

On April 4, 2016, the Treasury issued temporary regulations further
addressing inversion and earnings stripping.119 The April 2016 proposed
regulations not only supported the guidance in the previous two notices
regarding Section 7874 of the Code, but also targeted transactions that
increase related-party debt that does not finance new investment in the
U.S., relating to Code Section 385.120
Immediately following the announcement and release of the
proposed regulations in April 2016, U.S. businesses expressed concerns
about the excessiveness of the proposed regulations in both their reach

115. See Internal Revenue Bulletin: Notice 2014-52, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Oct. 14, 2014).
116. Id. For purposes of Notice 2014-52, non-ordinary course distributions mean “the excess of all
distributions made during a taxable year by the domestic entity with respect to its stock or partnership
interests, as applicable, over 110 percent of the average of such distributions during the thirty-six
month period immediately preceding such taxable year.” Id.
117. See I.R.S. Notice 2015-79 (discussing additional rules regarding inversions and related
transactions).
118. Id.
119. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Issues Inversion Regulations and Proposed
Earnings Stripping Regulations (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/jl0404.aspx.
120. Id.
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and cost.121 In the six months following the release of the new rules, there
were multiple estimates on how the proposed rules would impact the
day-to-day operations of U.S. businesses, and much of the discussion
stressed the impracticability of complying with the Treasury’s rules. 122 As
a result of much public comment on the proposed regulations under
Section 385, the Treasury announced the final and temporary versions of
the regulations in October 2016, which included certain exemptions from
the earlier version of the rules.123 While the final version of the
regulations exempts certain types of corporations that were included in
the proposed rules, debt issued by these corporations will still have to
meet the criteria set forth in the regulations, which required the same
standards of compliance as noted under the proposed rules.124 Moreover,
for the corporations to which the rules do apply, the final rules preserve
the heavy compliance burden and the harsh consequences of
re-characterization.125 Even with the exceptions provided by the final
regulations, these rules still make it more expensive for companies to
remain in the United States, thereby increasing the incentive to invert.
B.

THE SCOPE OF THE 2016 ANTI-INVERSION REGULATIONS

As mentioned above, the proposed and final regulations announced
in 2016 expand and provide guidance primarily on two sections of the
Code: Section 7874 and Section 385. Section 7874 addresses the
structure of transactions commonly used for inversion, and Section 385
addresses whether the character of an interest in a corporation is treated
as debt or equity for tax purposes.126 Before understanding how the
proposed and final regulations under these sections will affect the costs
of doing business for U.S. entities, it is helpful to briefly examine the
mechanics of the regulations.
1. Certain Acquisition Transactions Under Regulations to Code
Section 7874
Section 7874 is the primary section governing inversion under the
Code. Section 7874 generally applies to inversion transactions only if (1)
the transaction includes an acquisition of a U.S. entity by a foreign
121. See Letter from Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n Am. Chemistry Council et al., to Jacob Lew, U.S.
Treas. Sec. (May 12, 2016) (on file with BusinessRoundtable.org).
122. See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 56 (analyzing the impacts of proposed
Section 385 regulations on corporate taxation).
123. Press Release, supra note 34.
124. Peter L. Faber, SALT Implications of Final Section 385 Debt-Equity Regulations,
MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-leadership/
publications/2016/10/salt-implications-debt-equity-regulations.
125. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385 (2016).
126. See I.R.C. § 7874 (2005); I.R.C. § 385 (2016).
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acquiring entity; (2) the former shareholders of the acquired U.S. entity
own at least sixty percent of the stock of the combined foreign acquiring
entity following the acquisition; and (3) the foreign acquiring corporation
does not have substantial business activities in its country of
incorporation.127 More simply stated, whether or not Section 7874
applies to the transaction rests primarily on the percentage of ownership
of the foreign entity that is held by the U.S. entity shareholders and the
substantiality of the business activities in the foreign country in which
the entity is created.128
One available alternative for companies to avoid the applicability of
Section 7874 is to engage in a multiple-step acquisition, in which they
cascade the increases in the value of the foreign acquiring corporation
after each acquisition of a U.S. corporation, which allows for acquisitions
of larger U.S. corporations without falling within the scope of the Section
7874 rules.129 This strategy was the motivation for issuing the April 2016
temporary regulations under Section 7874.130 In the “multiple-step
acquisition,” or “serial inverter” rule, the Treasury targeted U.S.
companies that acquire a foreign company that has a history of inversion
itself.131 The rule applies to prior transactions that occur within a threeyear period, ending on the signing date of the relevant transaction.132
When the multiple-step acquisition rule applies, the ownership ratios are
adjusted so that the consequences of Section 7874 likely still apply.133

127. SIDLEY, NEW INVERSION REGULATIONS IMPLEMENT AND EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE
ANTI-INVERSION TAX RULES 1 (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.sidley.com/~/media/update-pdfs/2016/
04/20160407-tax-update.pdf. If the level of ownership after the transaction continues at somewhere
between sixty percent and eighty percent of what the ownership was of the acquired U.S. entity, then
Section 7874 imposes special gain recognition on the U.S. entity and any entities which are part of the
“expanded affiliate group” (“EAG”) of the U.S. entity. See VanderWolk, supra 112, at 700 (analyzing
the application of I.R.C. § 7874 (2005)). The term “expanded affiliate group” pertains to one or more
chains of includible corporations connected through stock ownership with a common parent. I.R.C.
§ 1504(a) (2014). The special gain (“inversion gain”) recognition on the U.S. entity and members of
the EAG applies for ten years from the last date on which properties are acquired as part of the
transaction. See I.R.C. § 7874(d)(1)(A) (2005). If the former shareholders of the acquired U.S. entity
own at least eighty percent of the stock of the combined foreign acquiring entity following the
acquisition, then the foreign corporation will be treated as a domestic corporation for tax purposes,
thus denying the tax benefits of the transaction. I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2005).
128. See I.R.C. 7874.
129. SIDLEY, supra note 127.
130. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 119.
131. Jeffrey Zients & Seth Hanlon, The Corporate Inversions Tax Loophole: What You Need to
Know, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 8, 2016, 6:39 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2016/04/08/corporate-inversions-tax-loophole-what-you-need-know.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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2. Rules Regarding the Treatment of Debt Under Code
Section 385
Under section 385 of the Code the Secretary has the authority to
prescribe regulations “as may be necessary or appropriate to determine
whether an interest in a corporation is treated as debt or equity for tax
purposes.”134 The section provides factors, developed through case law,
to be taken into account in determining “whether a debtor-creditor
relationship exists or a corporation-shareholder relationship exists.135
a.

The Existing Rules and the Importance of the
Debt/Equity Distinction

Corporations typically prefer debt, rather than equity, because of the
way U.S. tax law¾as well as other jurisdictions¾has traditionally treated
debt for tax purposes.136 The different tax treatment of debt and equity is
most important to an issuing corporation with regard to the deductibility
of current payments (either interest or distributions) made on debt or
equity.137 Because the Code provides this divergent treatment of debt and
equity, corporate taxpayers often structure transactions in a way that
treats an instrument as debt if there is no pressing non-tax reason for
classifying the instrument as equity.138
In addition to the preference for debt financing under most tax
regimes, the use of internal debt within a multinational group leads to
important cost savings and increased flexibility.139 For U.S. multinational
groups in particular, internal market activity reflects firm reaction to
expensive and uncontrollable features of the external market.140 Due to
134. I.R.C. § 385(a) (2016).
135. Id. at (b). These factors include whether there is a written agreement for repayment
accompanied by interest; whether there is subordination to or preference over any other debt of the
corporation; the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation; and the option of convertibility of the debt
into equity. Id. at (b)(1)–(5).
136. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2015). First, the Code allows businesses a deduction for interest paid on a
debt, which can be taken against both ordinary and capital gain income to the business. Equity,
however, is treated much differently under the Code. Section 163(a) allows a deduction for “all interest
paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness,” but no such deduction is allowed for
distributions to the corporation’s shareholders. Id. A corporation may not recognize any loss or
deduction on the distribution of dividends or on the repurchase of stock. See I.R.C. § 311. Dividends,
therefore, are paid out of after-tax income and are typically subject to multiple levels of tax. Harry
Huizinga, Luc Laeven & Gaëtan Nicodème, Capital Structure and International Debt Shifting (Eur.
Comm’n. Working Paper No. 263, 1, 2 2006).
137. William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Fundamental Tax Reform and Corporate Financial
Policy, 12 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 191, 196–97 (1998).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1943).
139. Nico Dewaelheyns & Cynthia Van Hulle, Internal Capital Markets and Capital Structure:
Bank Versus Internal Debt, 16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 345, 351 (2010).
140. Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, & James R. Hines Jr., The Internal Markets of Multinational
Firms, 87 SURV. CURRENT BUS. 42, 42 (2007).
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the tax treatment, as well as the non-tax benefits of this type of financing,
internal debt has become a key feature of multinational corporations.141
b.

Proposed, Temporary, and Final Changes Under the 2016
Section 385 Regulations

When the Treasury issued the April 2016 proposed regulations
under Section 385, it added rules regarding the criteria for treating an
interest as debt or equity for tax purposes.142 Prior to the proposed and
final regulations, a U.S. subsidiary could issue debt to its foreign parent
as a dividend distribution following an inversion, and the foreign parent
could then transfer that debt to a related foreign entity in a low-tax
jurisdiction.143 In turn, the U.S. subsidiary was able to deduct the
subsequent interest paid to the related foreign affiliate.144 Because this
type of transaction is one of the benefits to a firm after inversion, the
Treasury’s goal in issuing the proposed regulations under Section 385
was to reduce the post-inversion benefits available to the entire group.145
In the six months between the announcement of the April 2016
proposed regulations and the release of the October 2016 final
regulations, the Treasury made a number of changes to the scope and
application of the rules regarding the treatment of debt.146 Due to the
excessive burdens estimated under the proposed regulations and the
criticism received by the Treasury thereafter, the final regulations were
created with a number of revisions to the April 2016 proposed rules.147
Most notably, the final regulations relaxed the timing and scope of the
documentation requirements; reserved application to debt instruments
issued by a foreign corporation to a foreign corporation in a group;
provided guidance on satisfying the documentation requirements with
regards to cash pooling and other internal financing arrangements;
removed the proposed bifurcation rule, under which the Treasury could
treat an instrument as part-debt and part-equity; and created exclusions
for S corporations and other certain tax-exempt entities.148

141. Thiess Buettner, Michael Overesch, & Georg Wamser, Restricted Interest Deductibility and
Multinationals’ Use of Internal Debt Finance, 23 INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 785, 787 (2016).
142. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 119.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Press Release, supra note 34 (discussing “regulations to address earnings stripping.”).
147. Id.
148. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385 (2016). Under the April 2016 proposed regulations, the Treasury
required debt instruments to be substantiated within 30 days of issuance; applied to all members of
an EAG, including foreign corporations with no U.S. tax relevancy; applied generally to all related
party debt, including cash pooling; and applied to S corporations and certain tax-exempt entities.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(b)(3), 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20919–21 (Apr. 8, 2016).
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First, under the proposed regulations, if debt was issued by a foreign
parent company to a U.S. subsidiary, then the rules treated the
instrument as equity, thereby denying any deduction to the U.S.
subsidiary on interest payments to the foreign parent.149 If the debt is
treated as equity for U.S. tax purposes, then the interest payments on the
debt would be treated as dividends subject to outbound withholding tax
at whatever rate is provided by the applicable income tax treaty with the
foreign parent’s jurisdiction.150 In the final version of the section 385
regulations, however, the Treasury withdrew its application of this
treatment to foreign issuers.151 Thus, the final rules extend to debt
instruments issued by members of a group that are domestic
corporations.152
Second, the documentation corporate taxpayers must prepare and
maintain to substantiate an interest as debt, rather than equity, generally
applies to an “expanded affiliate group” (“EAG”).153 The proposed and
final regulations broadened the definition of EAG to include foreign and
tax-exempt corporations, as well as certain corporations held
indirectly.154 Further, if the section 385 regulations apply to an entity
based on these criteria, then the entity will be required to comply with
documentation and reporting requirements for any debt instruments
issued by a member of an EAG to another member of the EAG.155 If the

149. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(b)(3), 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20919–21.
150. David P. Hariton, U.S. Taxation of Related Party Debt: New Proposed Regulations, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE FIN. REG. (Apr. 20, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2016/04/20/u-s-taxation-of-related-party-debt-new-proposed-regulations.
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1.
152. Id.
153. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20919 (Apr. 8, 2016). This section uses the
definition of “affiliate group” from Code section 1504. An “affiliate group” under section 1504(a) is one
or more chains of includible corporations connected through stock ownership with a common parent
corporation. See I.R.C. § 1504(a) (2014). The stock ownership test under this section requires that the
common parent owns directly at least fifty percent stock of at least one of the other includible
corporations, and that stock meeting the fifty percent requirement is owned directly by one or more of
the includible corporations. Id. For example, if FC, a foreign corporation, owns more than fifty percent
of the stock of DC, a domestic corporation that owns more than fifty percent of the stock of DS, another
domestic corporation, then FC, DC, and DS make up an EAG. Under the definition in section 1504,
however, foreign corporations and tax-exempt corporations are excluded from the term “includible
corporation.” Id. § 1504(b).
154. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20919 (Apr., 8, 2016). In the April 2016
proposed regulations, the term “expanded affiliate group” applied also to S corporations, regulated
investment companies and real estate investment trusts, and partnerships; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.385-B(2)(b). In final version of the regulations released in October 2016, the Treasury modified the
expanded definition of an EAG to exclude S corporations, regulated investment companies, and real
estate investment trusts, and provided a partial exemption for certain partnerships.
155. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20929 (Apr. 8, 2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2
(2017) (Under the April proposed regulations, these requirements must have been satisfied within
thirty days of the issuance of the instrument between the group, or result in being automatically
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documentation requirements are not met or fail to establish the
characteristics of debt, the instrument risks reclassification as equity,
therefore losing any deduction.156 However, even if the documentation
requirements are satisfied, the instrument is not certain to remain
characterized as debt, and is subject to re-characterization if the Treasury
later determines so.157
Another widely contested rule in the proposed regulations was the
“Funding Rule,” which generally provided that debt issued in connection
with certain stock transactions would be treated as equity if it was issued
within three years before, or three years after, the transaction.158 This
application to transactions within a six-year range received much public
comment under the proposed regulations.159 A major concern under the
Funding Rule was the cascading effect of the recharacterization of debt,
whereby the recharacterization of one transaction as equity would trigger
the recharacterization of another within the six-year period, and so on.
The final rules, in response to comments received, offered limited relief
from the duplicating effect of the proposed rules by providing that once
a covered instrument is recharacterized under the Funding Rule, the
transaction that caused said recharacterization cannot cause the
recharacterization of another debt instrument after the first instrument
is repaid.160 This limitation still allows for a cascading effect, however, it
limits the potentially vast number of chains of reclassification that can be
initiated by a single transaction.
While the rules in the final regulations offer relief from some of the
excessive burdens of the proposed rules for certain companies, they
preserve the harsh consequences for the companies to which they still
apply. These regulations add punitive consequences to ordinary
transactions, increase the cost of compliance, decrease the flexibility of
corporate financing activities, and provide uncertainty to companies
operating under them.

treated as equity. However, the October 2016 final regulations modified this rule, giving the taxpayer
until the time of filing to complete the documentation).
156. Treasury Reg. § 1.385-2.
157. Id.
158. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3, 81 Fed. Reg. 20912, 20922. Specifically, the transactions that
trigger recharacterization include any distribution on stock, in exchange for stock of any member of
the EAG, or as “boot” in an internal asset reorganization. Id. “Boot” refers to certain “nonqualified
preferred stock” under Code Section 351(g)(2), which is certain preferred stock with debt-like
characteristics. STEPHEN SHWARZ & DANIEL J. LATHROPE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
TAXATION 457 (Found. Press 5th ed. 2012).
159. See, e.g., Letter from Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n Am. Chemistry Council et al., supra note 121
(This letter, on behalf of twenty-three U.S. corporations to Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew, expressed
the burdens and costs the new rules would place on continuing to do business in the U.S.).
160. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(b)(6) (2017).

WILSON-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2017]

C.

12/22/17 12:50 AM

THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

417

THE ADDED COSTS AND BURDENS UNDER THE 2016 ANTI-INVERSION
RULES

The new rules set forth in the 2016 anti-inversion regulations will
further increase the costs of doing business in the U.S. and further
disadvantage U.S. businesses as compared to their foreign competitors,
thereby increasing the incentive for inversion. Because the
re-characterization rules and documentation requirements increase the
cost of daily operations and planning, in addition to lost deductions, the
costs associated with compliance may outweigh those of inversion for
certain companies. Further, the drastic changes to such a critical aspect
of corporate finance within such a short timeframe have created concern
and confusion as to what the appropriate standards are, how they can be
met, and what other essential business practices are at risk of
experiencing the same changes in treatment.161
While the revisions under the final Section 385 regulations are an
improvement over the April 2016 proposed rules, the issue of
reclassifying a debt instrument as equity is still a major concern for the
firms to which the final regulations do apply. Moreover, the compliance
burden extends to even those entities that are exempted from the
re-characterization rules. The final regulations preserve the significant
consequences for noncompliance and impact a large number of internal
financing, reorganization, and ordinary course transactions.162
1. The Risk of Re-characterization and Lost Deductions
The re-characterization rule in the final regulations will recast debt
as equity if a member of an EAG issues the instrument in a “tainted”
transaction to another member of the EAG, and if the instrument is
deemed to have funded the transaction.163 For example, consider a
foreign parent that has a U.S. subsidiary seeking to expand in the United
States with a loan financed by the parent company. The parent company
finances the expansion, loaning $200 million to its subsidiary, which was
borrowed from a foreign bank in the country where the parent company
161. See Philip R. Hirschfeld & Stanley C. Ruchelman, Uproar over Proposed § 385 Regulations:
Will Treasury Delay Adoption?, 3 RUCHELMAN INSIGHTS 40 (2016), http://publications.ruchelaw.
com/news/2016-09/Code-385-pushback.pdf.
162. Grant Thornton, Treasury Finalizes and Significantly Modifies the Debt-Equity Regulations
Under Section 385 (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.grantthornton.com/issues/library/alerts/tax/
2016/Flash/treasury-modifies-debt-equity-regulations.aspx.
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3 (2017). (A “tainted” transaction within the meaning of the 385
regulations includes, generally, “a distribution to shareholders; acquisition of an EAG member in an
asset reorganization with boot; and acquiring stock of another EAG member in exchange for
property”); KPMG, Section 385 Final Regulations: Initial Reactions (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/10/16460v5.pdf.
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is located. The parent is able to use its worldwide assets as collateral,
while the U.S. subsidiary is only able to use its own assets. Therefore, the
parent company has the ability to borrow on better terms.164 Assume the
parent company borrowed the $200 million from a bank for 20 years at
a three percent interest rate and that the U.S. subsidiary took the loan
from the parent with a twenty-year term and a four percent interest rate.
Prior to the regulations, the U.S. subsidiary would have been able to
deduct $8 million per year for interest paid on its debt to the parent.165
Assuming the affiliate group meets the criteria for application of the
regulations, and that the earnings and profits of the entities are such that
the section 385 regulations are triggered by this transaction, the
$8 million of annual interest payments on the loan would be
recharacterized as dividends to the parent, and is therefore not
deductible.166
2. The Increased Costs of External Borrowing
If the companies in the above example want to avoid this risk of
recharacterization, then the U.S. subsidiary can borrow directly from a
bank, likely with less desirable loan terms. In addition, the parent
company would lose $2 million in net income from the difference
between the lower interest it paid on the loan to the bank ($6 million)
and the higher interest payments received by the U.S. subsidiary ($8
million). Further, the subsidiary borrower would make interest payments
charged at a higher rate, and thus the cost of borrowing would increase
to above $8 million, depending on the rate offered by the third party
lender.
Subsidiaries of MNCs rely heavily on these types of loans from
parent corporations or related parties to finance a broad range of
business activities.167 Because of the limitations placed on the use of cash
between related entities under the section 385 regulations, companies to
which the regulations apply may need to increase the use of third party
financing to fund business activities traditionally funded through
internal financing. This limited ability to use internal cash to fund
business activities, as the above example illustrates, will potentially

164. See Senay Agca et al., Financial Reforms, Financial Openness, and Corporate Borrowing:
International Evidence 12 (IMF Working Paper, 2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1007935
(explaining that larger firms with more assets are able to borrow at more favorable terms because they
are able to offer the lender more verifiable collateral).
165. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (2015).
166. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3.
167. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Vikram Nanda, Financing of Multinational Subsidiaries: Parent Debt
vs. External Debt, 4 J. OF CORP. FIN. 87, 88 (1998).
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increase the cost of capital, thereby reducing the appeal of business
investments.168
3. The Increased Compliance Burden
In addition to increasing the cost of capital, the documentation
requirements under the proposed Section 385 regulations were the
primary concerns raised in the nearly 200 comment letters received by
the Treasury and IRS between April and October 2016.169 While the
October 2016 final regulations reduced the transactions and entities to
which the rules apply, companies still need to implement and maintain
systems of documentation that can support the character of transactions
and meet the requirements under the regulations if they wish to keep an
instrument classified as debt.
a.

Compliance Complications for Certain Ordinary Course
Transactions

One area where the proposed regulations would have been
particularly burdensome was the application of the rules to common
forms of intercompany financing, specifically a practice known as “cash
pooling.” Cash pooling involves multiple affiliates that “pool” excess
funds together and make those funds available to affiliates that need it.170
The excess funds that are pooled together from the affiliates are usually
transferred from each affiliate’s account and deposited into one “pool”
account, which is typically recorded as a loan to the cash pooling
account.171
The proposed rules under section 385 were not particularly clear on
how the documentation rules applied to arrangements like cash pooling
or revolving credit arrangements, which are not generally documented
by any separate legal agreement.172 The final regulations make clear that
168. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 56.
169. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, STATE TAX IMPLICATIONS OF NEWLY RELEASED IRC SECTION 385
REGULATIONS, TAX INSIGHTS 1 (2016), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/state-local-tax/newsletters/
salt-insights/assets/pwc-state-tax-uncertainty-continues-under-new-section-385-regulations.pdf.
170. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PROPOSED SECTION 385 REGULATIONS:
INBOUND AND OUTBOUND EXAMPLES, 4, 8 (2016).
171. See id. at 4. For example, suppose you have Parent Corp., a U.S. parent of a multinational
group owning all stock of four foreign subsidiaries: 1, 2, 3, and Pool Corp. (together, with Parent Corp.,
“U.S. Group”). Foreign subsidiaries 1, 2, and 3 are all operating corporations and Pool Corp. is the
group’s cash pool leader. When subsidiaries 1, 2, and 3 have excess funds, they deposit those funds to
Pool Corp. into the cash pool. If foreign subsidiaries 1, 2, or 3 need extra funds, then the corporation
will borrow those funds from Pool Corp. rather than obtaining external financing from a bank or other
third party. Id. at 9.
172. SKADDEN TAX GRP., IRS AND TREASURY ISSUE FINAL DEBT/EQUITY REGULATIONS (2016),
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/IRS_and_Treasury_Issue_Final_Debt_
Equity_Regulations.pdf.
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the documentation rules apply not only to instruments issued in the legal
form of debt, but also to various similar transactions that are not typically
supported by a separate agreement, including revolving credit
agreements and cash pooling arrangements.173
The final Section 385 regulations provide an exception from the
recharacterization rule, however, for certain short-term debt and cash
pooling arrangements, given that the instrument satisfies one of two
tests.174 So while certain arrangements will not be subject to
recharacterization, they will still need to comply with the documentation
requirements. While these exceptions were issued with the intent of
relieving businesses of some of the burdensome consequences to
ordinary course transactions, the rules remain complex and potentially
difficult to administer.175
b.

Estimated Costs of Compliance Under the Section 385
Regulations

Accompanying the announcement of the proposed regulations in
April 2016, the Treasury provided a Regulatory Impact Analysis
including estimated costs of documentation and compliance under the
proposed regulations.176 The Treasury’s estimate for the annual
“paperwork burden associated with the proposed regulations” for
substantiation of related party debt was approximately $13 million for all
companies annually.177 The government estimated that the total number
of entities to which the proposed regulations would apply was 21,000;
estimated that annual reporting burden per entity would have been 35
hours; and estimated that the total reporting burden to all entities
complying with the proposed regulations would have been 735,000

173. See Treas. Reg. § 1.385-2(3)(i)(A) (2017).
174. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-3(c)(i) (2017). Under the “current assets test,” (1) the interest
rate must be no greater than an arm’s length rate, and (2) immediately after the issuance, the issuer’s
balance of expanded group debt, which meets one of four criteria, cannot exceed the issuer’s
“short-term financing needs” during the course of the normal operating cycle. Id. The second test is
the “270-day test,” which is generally met if the debt instrument has a term of 270 days or less; bears
an arm’s length interest rate; and where the issuer is not a net borrower for more than 270 days during
the taxable year or 270 consecutive days across taxable years; or where the issuer is a not a net
borrower from any other member of the group for 270 days of the year. Id.
175. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170, at 8. If these transactions are completed at
the end of each day, or even each week, with multiple members within a cash pool, then meeting the
documentation requirements under the section 385 regulations could potentially require the formal
documentation of hundreds of transactions each day, which is currently not the common practice with
these types of arrangements. Id.
176. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2016), https://www.regulations.
gov/document?D=IRS-2016-0014-0001.
177. Id.
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hours.178 Taking the government’s estimate with a total annual cost of $13
million and dividing it by the estimated 735,000 hours, the estimate
implies an average cost of labor at $18 per hour. The government’s
estimate¾when taking into consideration the current standards of
compliance and the need to implement new compliance systems; the
hourly costs of legal, tax, and other professionals needed to advise on and
structure a system; the number of companies to which the regulations
apply; and the amount of related party debt within those companies—
seems optimistically and unrealistically low.179
Other estimates predicted that the costs associated with complying
with the proposed regulations would be much higher. In July 2016, PwC
released a report analyzing the proposed regulations and the potential
costs of compliance for Fortune 100 companies.180 The analysis took into
consideration both the initial startup costs of implementing the new
compliance systems and the ongoing operational costs thereafter.181 In
start-up costs, the report includes fees relating to legal, accounting,
financial planning and forecasting, tax, and even human resources.182 In
total, the report estimated that the number of hours needed to design
such a compliance system would require approximately 21,600 hours
between the cost items listed.183 The report pulled statistics from the
Department of Labor for wages associated with each of the cost items,
multiplying the associated wages by the estimated hours needed for each
item.184 In the year of implementation alone, for just the Fortune 100
companies, the total estimated startup and operating costs for each
company totaled $3.994 million.185 For each year thereafter, the report
estimated that the annual maintenance and operations of the new
compliance system would require 9,660 hours per entity, estimating
costs of $1.245 million per entity, per year.186
Note that these figures are attributable to the costs of compliance
only with the new rules in the section 385 regulations, and not inclusive
of a corporation’s total tax compliance costs. Considering that these
estimates were based on a sample using characteristics from only
Fortune 100 companies and that the final regulations were narrowed in

178. See I.R.S. Notice 2016-17, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 636, 637 (Apr. 25, 2016).
179. For example, the hourly rate for tax attorneys typically ranges anywhere from $200 to $1,000
per hour of work. See How Much Does a Tax Attorney Cost?, CROSS LAW (Jan. 16, 2017),
http://www.crosslawgroup.com/blog/hiring-tax-attorney-worth-cost.
180. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170, at 1.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 16.
183. Id. at 17 Table V-1.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 18.
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scope so that they would not affect a number of smaller entities, these
figures are likely fair estimates, as they consider only the costs of
implementation and maintenance of compliance systems for larger
companies.
While the Treasury has decreased the number of transactions to
which the documentation requirements apply, the compliance burdens
of applicable transactions are the same. A group engaging in debt
transactions will first need to (1) determine whether each type of
transaction used falls within scope of the proposed and final regulations;
(2) go through the list of new exceptions to the rules to determine the risk
of recharacterization; and then (3) figure out how to organize a system
that will support the transaction under the criteria outlined in the
regulations. Because many related party debt transactions are
documented by formal agreements, setting up this type of system could
potentially require a significant amount of time and resources.
III. THE TREASURY’S PUNITIVE APPROACH PROVIDES
A GREATER INCENTIVE FOR INVERSION
A. DISCOURAGING U.S. RESIDENCE THROUGH COMPETITIVE
DISADVANTAGE
The Treasury has established as one of its goals the promotion of “a
level playing field for U.S. financial institutions internationally, and to
enhance U.S. competitiveness.”187 This goal, however, is contrary to the
approach taken in the recent anti-inversion regulations, and the punitive
regulatory approach in general.
The foreign competition faced by U.S. corporations has grown as the
globalization of business has accelerated. When globalization of business
activities increased dramatically in the 1980s, competition for MNC
investment grew as well.188 This resulted in other countries lowering
corporate tax rates, adopting less burdensome corporate tax rules, and
simplifying tax laws for MNCs.189
The allure of inversion stems from the competitive disadvantages
that flow from being taxed as a U.S. corporation.190 U.S.-based
companies are at a disadvantage when compared to their foreign
competitors because they can either operate in a high-tax jurisdiction,
paying tax at a higher rate than the U.S. rate; or, if they attempt to lower

187. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2012–2015 12 (2012).
188. David C. Elkins, The Merits of Tax Competition in a Globalized Economy, 91 IND. L.J. 905,
912 (2016).
189. Id.
190. James Mann, Note, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of a Larger Problem, The Corporate
Income Tax, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 521, 522 (2005).
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the tax they pay, fall under Subpart F of the Code, which triggers
immediate taxation at the U.S. tax rate.191 Thus, a U.S. company
operating in a foreign jurisdiction will pay more in tax on every dollar
than its competition within the same jurisdiction. All else equal, the lower
amounts of after-tax income for the U.S. company create a disadvantage
by reducing the company’s ability to set competitive prices, engage in
financing activities, and invest, thus offering a greater after-tax return on
investment.192
The disadvantage of U.S. companies has steadily increased for a mix
of reasons¾the high tax rate, the taxation of foreign profits, and the
Subpart F rules.193 Constant changes and expansion of tax rules through
regulations in the U.S. further accelerate the erosion of a U.S. company’s
competitive position.194 The Treasury has persisted in its practice of
responding to each transaction by adding to the complexity of the system,
which has merely triggered new tax planning opportunities and
increased the costs of doing business.195 By increasing the costs of doing
business, the regulations increase the need for a company to make up for
these disadvantages in other ways, for example, through inversion and
earnings stripping. The 2016 regulations increase the incentive to
relocate, just as the U.S. saw many of its corporations do after each set of
anti-inversion regulations in order to avoid the consequences of the new
rules and escape any further regulations that would likely follow.196
While there certainly was a time when the strengths of the U.S.
economy were enough to offset the disadvantages of its tax system, many
other countries have grown to offer most of those same strengths, but
with much less burden, and the U.S. has failed to adjust. By continuing
this pattern of punitive regulation, the Treasury is attempting to repair
the corporate inversion problem by the very approach that created it¾an
uncompetitive corporate tax system.

191. NAT’L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL, 2 INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2001),
http://www.nftc.org/default/tax/fip/NFTC1a%20Volume2(1).pdf.
192. Id. at 12.
193. Id. at 13-14.
194. Id. at 14.
195. See, e.g., Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration: The Merits of Simplification in
Tax Reform Hearing Before the Comm. On Fin. U.S. S., 114th Cong. 7 (2015) (statement of Mihir A.
Desai, Ph.D., Mizuho Financial Group Professor of Finance & Professor of Law, Harvard University).
196. See supra Part II.A.1.
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CREATING COSTS TO U.S. RESIDENCE THAT OUTWEIGH THE
CONSEQUENCES OF INVERSION

Another important policy concern in international taxation, as in all
areas of taxation, is neutrality¾that tax laws be designed in a way that
avoids affecting economic decision-making as much as possible.197 In the
United States, the high corporate tax rate and taxation of worldwide
profits already play a large role in disrupting this goal, as is evidenced by
the amount of time and resources U.S. companies devote to tax planning,
strategy, and avoidance.198 The added uncertainty and complexity
brought by the regulations also adds pressure for a corporation to
relocate to a less burdensome jurisdiction. Over time, these combined
factors provide a significant incentive for inversion.
1. Remaining a U.S. Corporation versus Relocating to a Foreign
Jurisdiction
To put this all into perspective, take the very simplified example of
two multinational corporations¾one domiciled in the U.S. and one in
Luxembourg, each with one U.S. subsidiary and one foreign subsidiary,
and each subsidiary produces $100 million in pre-tax earnings that it will
distribute to the parent.
a.

The U.S. Company Falls Behind: The Cost of the Corporate
Tax Rate

Due to the different tax rate and treatment of foreign earnings, the
U.S. Corporation will end up with $130 million of after-tax earnings,
while the Luxembourg Corporation will end up with $145 million of
after-tax earnings.199 With the U.S. Corporation already trailing $15
million behind its foreign competition, consider now the time it takes
each company just to file its tax returns.

197. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L
TAX J. 487 (2003), http://www.jstor.org/stable/41790118 (presenting concepts of neutrality applied
to proposals for tax reform in the United States).
198. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170.
199. The tax on the earnings U.S. subsidiary of each corporation will be $35¾thirty-five percent
U.S. tax rate applied to the $100 of earnings¾leaving $65 after-tax; while the tax on the foreign
subsidiary will be $20¾twenty percent Luxembourg corporate tax rate applied to $100 of
earnings¾leaving $80 after the foreign tax authorities have been paid, and leaving a total in after-tax
earnings of $145. However, because the subsidiaries will distribute these earnings to the parent
corporations, the dividend to the U.S. Corporation will be taxed at thirty-five percent as well; crediting
the $20 already paid to the Luxembourg tax authorities on the amount, and leaving the U.S.
Corporation with an additional $15 in taxes owed on the same amount. See I.R.C. § 901 (2010).
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Falling Further Behind: The Cost of Compliance

For the U. . Corporation, the average time committed to filing is 175
hours, while the average time for the Luxembourg Corporation is 55
hours.200 Based on Department of Labor data, the average hourly cost of
tax and legal services is approximately $127 per hour, which puts U.S.
Corporation further behind the Luxembourg company by slightly over
$15,000 just for filing.201
In addition to the cost of filing, U.S. Corporation has a team of
lawyers and accountants to help the company navigate the ambiguity and
complexity of the tax rules for MNCs. If U.S. Company is on the larger
side, the extra legal and tax fees can be estimated to cost around $7.5
million per year.202 Increasing this burden, the 2016 regulations are
expected to impose costs of approximately $4 million in the year of
implementation, and approximately $1.25 million to comply each year
thereafter.203
c.

Loss of Ability to Compensate For Disadvantage

Assume (somewhat safely) that the U.S. Corporation wants to avoid
the tax on its foreign income. To achieve this goal, the U.S. Corporation
will likely deem the foreign income as “permanently reinvested
earnings,” and therefore not be taxed on the distribution.204 This,
however, comes at the cost of not being able to currently use those
earnings that are permanently reinvested, and thus the U.S. Corporation
will need to make up for the unavailability of this income in other ways,
for example, through intercompany loans.205

200. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PAYING TAXES 2016 123, 125 (10th ed. 2016),
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/paying-taxes-2016/paying-taxes-2016.pdf. The compliance calculation
in this report includes only compulsory payments, and takes into consideration only three types of
taxes¾corporate income tax, sales tax, and labor taxes; and the preparation time includes the time to
collect information necessary to compute tax liability, the time needed to actually file, and the time
needed to make payments. Id. at 103. Thus, this report excludes any non-compulsory tax compliance
hours, such as maintaining accounting data; planning and strategy to reduce liability, which includes
the time spent interpreting regulations; audits, appeals, and dispute proceedings; and, possibly, tax
penalties and prosecution proceedings.
201. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170, at 17.
202. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER
TEXAS 162 (4th ed. 2008) (finding that large companies in the U.S. pay about $5 million per year on
tax matters, with many of the largest spending over $10 million).
203. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 170 at 17.
204. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, RECOGNITION OF INCOME TAXES
TOPIC 740, § 30-25.
205. See supra Part II.C.1. For example, in 2010, HP used intercompany loans quite heavily, with
two HP entities lending the parent about $6 billion in a single year. Kate Linebaugh, How Firms Tap
Overseas Cash: U.S. Companies Can Borrow Millions of ‘Trapped’ Funds from Foreign Units If They
Follow the Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2013, at B1.
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Referring back to the earlier example of intercompany debt under
the 2016 regulations, the U.S. Corporation is now faced with the risk of
having certain affiliate debt recharacterized as equity.206 To avoid this
risk, the U.S. Corporation can seek more expensive external borrowing,
which results in the loss of income to the group from the interest charged
on the loan, the loss of deduction relating to the interest payments, and
the likely higher cost of borrowing from a third party.207
d.

Inversion-Related Costs Can Be Less Than the Cost To
Comply With the 2016 Regulations Alone

The actual costs incurred in inversion are difficult to gauge, as they
depend on specific characteristics of a company. However, for example,
consider a company with similar characteristics to Altisource Portfolio
Solutions, a formerly U.S. corporation, which inverted to Luxembourg in
2009.208 Altisource incurred one-time inversion-related fees of $3.4
million.209 If Altisource were subject to the 2016 anti-inversion
regulations, the legal and accounting costs incurred for its inversion
would be more than $2 million less than the cost of compliance with the
regulations in the first two years.210
Altisource reduced its tax liability by nearly $12 million following its
inversion, reducing its effective tax rate from thirty percent in 2009 as a
U.S. corporation to ten percent in 2011 as a resident of Luxembourg.211
In addition, the company recognized revenue of $423.7 million in 2011,
as compared to $103 million in revenue in 2009, which grew to over $1
billion by 2016.212
While not every firm will have the same characteristics as the
example of the Altisource inversion, the fact that a firm can pay less in
one-time legal fees to completely relocate than it would to implement the
requirements of a single set of regulations indicates that anti-inversion
regulations, at least for certain companies, can have the effect of
encouraging inversion. For companies in similar situations, not only
could inversion increase the value to shareholders through the
availability of resources otherwise allocated to U.S. tax and tax

206. See supra Part II.C.1.
207. Id.
208. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K: ALTISOURCE PORTFOLIO SOLUTIONS, S.A. (Dec. 31, 2009).
209. Id. at 21.
210. This figure is the result of the approximately $4 million estimated in startup fees and $1.2
million in annual fees thereafter estimated under the 2016 Section 385 regulations, less the amount
Altisource paid for professional services on the inversion. See id.; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra
note 170.
211. Id. at 29.
212. Id. at 3; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K: ALTISOURCE PORTFOLIO SOLUTIONS, S.A. (Dec.
31, 2015).

WILSON-69.1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2017]

THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS

12/22/17 12:50 AM

427

compliance, but it may be the only option of remaining competitive or
sustaining the enterprise.
For a larger company, the added cost to comply with the
documentation requirements under the regulations may not be as
damaging as it is likely to be to a smaller company. However the loss of
flexibility in internal financing will likely interrupt a significant amount
of routine transactions and result in higher costs in outside borrowing.
Because of the way debt has traditionally been treated under the Code,
these companies have relied heavily on intercompany financing, with
related party debt transactions totaling multiple billions in a single
year.213 Limiting the ability to continue these transactions disrupts a
major feature of how these companies operate and removes one of the
few ways in which a company can attempt to make up for the competitive
disadvantages it faces by remaining in the U.S., thus increasing the
incentive for inversion.

CONCLUSION
Through the seemingly endless regulations issued by the Treasury,
the goal of the U.S. appears to be to reduce the tax benefits that a
company can receive with a foreign legal address, thus reducing the
incentive to invert. However, the Treasury should redirect its focus to the
benefits the United States can receive from creating a more welcoming
tax home for corporations. Of the three main factors driving corporations
out of the U.S.¾the corporate tax rate, a worldwide system, and
increasingly burdensome and complex regulations¾the Treasury’s
authority to issue rules under the Code consumes the most time, results
in more confusion, and creates greater costs for corporations.
Taking into account the goals of a corporation and the factors
impacting location decisions for multinational companies¾the high
corporate tax rate on a company’s worldwide income in the United
States; the existing costs of compliance for a U.S. company; the estimated
costs of compliance under the 2016 regulations; and the diminished
ability to compensate for these disadvantages through certain
practices¾when compared to the potential costs and benefits available
through inversion, corporations have an incentive to invest slightly more
initially to relocate, rather than undergo the added annual costs of
compliance required by the rules and the potential costs of any new
regulations the Treasury may issue.
Rather than trying to discourage tax avoidance by increasing tax
liability¾by making what was once tax-deductible interest into taxable
dividends and by increasing the tax burden by adding costly and time213. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 200.
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consuming compliance requirements¾the next administration should
veer away from the punitive approach and simplify the tax system in a
way that allows U.S. MNCs to compete with international competitors.
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